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ABSTRACT: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens 
are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar 
apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do 
not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any 
effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties hence be 
overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-
determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic 
views. The paper proceeds to argue against Kim’s (Kim 2000, 2005) attempt to 
articulate a plausible version of reductionism. It is then argued that psychological 
properties, along with paradigmatically causally efficacious macro-properties, such as 
toughness, are causally inefficacious in respect of their possessor’s typical effects, 
because they are insufficiently distinct from those effects. It is finally suggested that 
the distinction between epiphenomenalism and overdeterminationism maybe more 
terminological than real.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
I begin with some territory that will be familiar to most readers. Here is how the 
problem of mental causation has typically been set up since shortly after the onset of 
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non-reductive physicalism.1 It is now widely assumed that the realm of the physical is 
causally closed. This means that the probability of any event’s occurring is fully 
determined by physical causes.  This apparently leaves us with a limited number of 
options concerning psychological causation, none of which appear hugely attractive. 
Either: (a)  the psychological is epiphenomenal and can have no causal impact on the 
physical, or (b) the psychological is identical with the physical, or (c) actions are all 
overdetermined, each one having at least two distinct sufficient causes.  Option (b) 
subdivides into two further options. Either (b1) the psychological reduces to the 
physical and every psychological property is identical with some physical property, or 
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1  Cartesian dualism, which holds that minds and psychological events are non-physical, is generally 
held to be inconsistent with the existence of causal interaction between the psychological and the 
physical.  Indeed, Descartes’s contemporaries saw causation as a problem for him: ‘I could more 
readily allow that the soul has matter and extension than that an immaterial being has the capacity of 
moving a body and being affected by it’ said Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (letter of June 1643, 
translated in Anscombe and Geach eds., 1971).  Descartes’s reply to Elizabeth is widely agreed to be 
unconvincing.  However, I think that given what was known at the time, Descartes would have been 
able to offer a reasonable defence of his position. He might have adopted any of various accounts of 
causation (e.g. appealing to constant conjunction or to counterfactuals) and argued that the chosen 
account ratifies the existence of psychophysical causation without entailing that the mind is extended.  
The problem for Cartesian dualism only became a matter of clear and serious concern in the mid 1960s, 
by which time neurology had advanced to a point where it became reasonably clear that there is a 
complete physical causal explanation for every human action (see Papineau, 2000 for discussion).  And 
it is this that creates the current problematic.  
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(b2)  token psychological events are identical with or constituted from token physical 
events but psychological properties are not identical with physical properties. (b1) is 
widely held to be inconsistent with the multiple realization of the psychological by the 
physical. And (b2) appears to bring us back to the original problematic, with the 
properties as the locus of tension.  If one event causes another, it does so in virtue 
some of its properties and not others. If I throw a stone at a window and the window 
breaks, it is because the stone was hard and heavy that it broke the window and not, 
say, because it was grey and millions of years old. The properties in virtue of which 
an event has a particular effect are typically called the ‘causally efficacious properties 
of the cause with respect to the effect.’ Suppose, then, that a token neural event causes 
an action. We can ask ‘Does it do so in virtue of its physical properties or its 
psychological properties?’ and we are back to choosing between options (a) and (c) or 
returning to (b1). And none of those options appeal.  
 That, as I say, is how the problematic is typically set up within the Davidson-
Fodor package of token identity (or constitution), type dualism (or type pluralism) and 
supervenience  (e.g. Davidson, 1970, Fodor, 1974). I will call this, ‘The Standard 
Package’. I think there is quite a lot that is seriously questionable about that way of 
looking at things. I want to accept The Standard Package and take a look at the 
problematic. My plan is as follows. First, I will say a few words about why I think 
that neither (a), epiphenomenalism, nor (c), overdetermination, should be rejected as 
quickly as they often are. Indeed, these options are sometimes dismissed so quickly 
that it is difficult to find articulated arguments against them. Kim (2000, 2005) does 
articulate some arguments, and I will use them as my focus. Kim’s rejection of (a) and 
(c) lead him to favour a form of (b), reductionism. I will go on to criticise Kim’s 
reductive approach. I will then turn to a proposal due to Segal and Sober (1991) who 
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defend a version of (c), overdetermination, and argue that the proposal does not work. 
I will then go on to argue for a version of (a), epiphenomenalism. Finally I will 
suggest that the distinction between overdeterminationism and epiphenomenalism 
may be more rhetorical than real.  
 
2.  The Standard Package and Overdetermination 
 
Let me begin with The Standard Package - in particular Fodor’s version from Fodor 
(1974) - and why it might it seem fitting to add overdetermination to it. Let us 
suppose that we have a (non-strict) psychological law to the effect that every event 
with psychological property F causes an event with psychological property G; 
‘Ceteris paribus, every time someone has a strong desire to jump up and down, they 
jump up and down,’ for example. F has a wide variety of possible physical 
supervenience bases, m(F)1, ...., m(F)n. Every time the law is instantiated, the 
occurrence of the F event is realised by the occurrence of some m(F) event. The m(F) 
event causes, by physically explicable, unmysterious mechanisms, the occurrence of 
some m(G) event, where m(G) is a supervenience base for G.  
 Let us for the time being just accept that metaphysical picture. Then it is 
tempting to say that just as paradigmatic psychological properties (e.g. being a desire 
to jump up and down) supervene on physical properties, so also psychological2 laws 
supervene on physical laws and psychological causal relations supervene on physical 
causal relations. And, if we are tempted to say that, then we might well be tempted by 
overdetermination. For we do not conclude from the fact that psychological properties 
                                                
2 I will use ‘psychological’ as an abbreviation of ‘psychological and psychophysical’ when talking of 
laws and causation.  
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supervene on physical ones that psychological properties don’t exist. We do not 
conclude from the fact that psychological laws supervene on physical laws, that there 
are no psychological laws. So, to be consistent, we should adopt a similar attitude to 
psychological causation: we should not conclude from the fact that psychological 
causation supervenes on physical causation that it does not so much as occur. We 
have independent reason to believe that the m(F)s are causally efficacious in respect 
of causing G events. But that should not prevent us from allowing that F itself is also 
causally efficacious in respect of the very same effects. We should not think of F and 
the m(F)s as competing for efficacy. Rather, we should think of F’s efficacy as 
derived from from its m(F)s.3 
 So, on this approach, both m(F) and F are causally efficacious in the matter of 
causing Gs. That means that they are both sufficient for G events, under the 
circumstances. Some regard this idea as highly problematic. Kim, for example, 
regards ‘the overdetermination approach’ as ‘a non-starter’ (Kim 2000). But his 
arguments against it hinge crucially on a principle of Exclusion (2005: 42)  
 
Exclusion No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at a 
given time – unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination.  
 
In Kim’s terminology, a ‘genuine’ case of causal overdetermination is one in which 
‘each overdetermining cause plays a distinct and distinctive causal role’ (2005 42).  
 Kim doesn’t argue for Exclusion. He does offer remarks such as the following 
(2005 48):  
                                                
3 This is Segal and Sober’s (1991) position as well as, arguably, that of Kim (1984).  See also Sider 
(2003) for friendly remarks about overdetermination.  
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 To be a cause of [m(G)], [F] must somehow ride piggyback on physical causal 
 chains … And we may ask in virtue of what relation it bears to physical 
 property [m(F)] does [F] earn its entitlement to a free ride on the causal chain 
 from [m(F)] to [m(G)] and to claim this causal chain to be its own?  
 
I find it hard to interpret the question. The question of whether F is causally 
efficacious in bringing about m(G) is not a question of rights. Consider the analogy 
with existence. ‘To exist, F must somehow ride piggyback on a physical property 
m(F) and we may ask in virtue of what does F earn its entitlement to free ride on m(F) 
and to claim its existence to be its own?’ 
 The question carries no force. The thing to do is not to prejudge the issue but 
to look and see whether supervenient properties exist and whether they are efficacious 
in bringing about effects. And on first inspection, it looks as though they do. That is 
the way the world appears to us empirically. For example, it appears to us as though 
stones break windows, in part, because they are tough.4 Toughness supervenes on but 
does not reduce to microstructure. And properties like toughness (or at least analogues 
thereof, such as fracture toughness and impact strength) are real measurable properties 
understood in depth and detail by material science.  
 Kim thinks that Exclusion is obviously true: ‘I believe it is virtually an 
analytic truth with not much content’ (2001: 51). I take it that if Exclusion is virtually 
analytic then it is not actually analytic. But then, in the face of appearances, the onus 
                                                
4 The appearance is given some support by the counterfactual: if the stone hadn’t been tough, it 
wouldn’t have broken the window. For more on counterfactuals and mental causation see Bennett 
(2003). 
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is on its proponents to provide some argument for it. The empirical trumps the almost 
analytic.  
  Of course, if it were merely a coincidence that every time an F event caused a 
G event, some m(F) event or other just happened to crop up, for no apparent reason, 
and cause that same G event, then that would indeed be incredible.  That would be 
analogous to a world in which every time somebody was killed by a bullet they were 
also, at the same time, killed by some other unrelated means. But that is not how it 
goes with the standard package. The occurrence of F events and m(F) events are, of 
course, not unrelated. Rather, the co-occurrence of Fs and m(F)s is guaranteed by the 
supervenience component of the package. 
 On this view, overdetermination is not rare, but ubiquitous. It holds in all cases 
that fit the metaphysics of The Standard Package. If I throw a stone at a window and 
the window breaks, then we can explain what happened at more than one level. For 
example, we can explain it in relatively macroscopic terms, appealing to things like 
the stone’s toughness and mass. And we can explain it at the microscopic level by 
appealing to things like the arrangement of the stone’s component atoms and the 
strength of bonds among them. Both explanations appear to cite causally efficacious 
properties of the stone: e.g. its being tough and its being so-composed of atoms. The 
explanations don’t compete. So why suppose that the properties compete for the title 
of ‘causally efficacious’? Don’t prejudge the question of whether overdetermination is 
ubiquitous, but look and see whether it is.  
 It is fruitful (following Yablo 1992) to think about the issue in relation to 
determinates and determinables. Suppose we place a crimson cube in front of a 
mirror. This causes an image to appear to in the mirror. The image has many 
properties. It is crimson and, let’s say, square. But it is also red and rectangular.  
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Now what properties of the object caused there to be a red, rectangular image?  
One obvious answer is: redness and rectangularity. But another perfectly good answer 
is: crimsonness and squareness. These properties of the object cause there to be a 
crimson square image. And, since it follows logically that the image is also red and 
rectangular, they cause there to be a red, rectangular image. There is nothing very 
mysterious about this. Both crimsonness and redness, for example, have the power to 
cause red images, and the reason they do their causing at the same time and in relation 
to the same effects is because being crimson is a way of being red. Moreover, each 
time a red thing causes a red image, the redness is realised by some determinate shade 
that causes a correspondingly shaded image. But there is nothing particularly 
mysterious about that either. There are just many ways of being red and every red 
thing has got to be red in some way or other.5 
 Overdeterminationism, then, is at least a starter. What, then, of 
epiphenomenalism?  
 
3. Kim’s Epiphobia and Reductionism  
  
 Epiphenomenalism about psychological properties has had only a small 
number of champions (e.g. Jackson 1982).  And there is something of a tendency for 
people to dismiss it too quickly. Some think that the causal efficacy of psychological 
properties is given in our experience. Surely I know why I jumped up and down: it’s 
because I wanted to.  
                                                
5 Yablo argues that the kind of supervenience relation that holds between mental and physical is 
actually a variety of the determinable-determinate relationship.  
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 It is true that some of the time, it does seem to us that we know why we do 
something. I might contemplate whether to jump and down, be fully aware of my 
desire to do so and then, in the light of this desire, go ahead and jump. In such a case, 
it might well seem to me that my desire to jump up and down causes me to jump up 
and down. But, in my case at least, I don’t feel that I have a particular sense of which 
properties of that desire caused the action. Nothing in my experience contradicts the 
idea that it was its physical properties, and those alone, that did the work.  
Kim cites a case that might seem more compelling: pain. Suppose that I 
suddenly feel a burning pain, as I accidentally lean on the hob. I instantly pull my 
hand away. Surely, someone might say, it is because your hand hurt that you moved 
it. But even in that case, I don’t think my experience presents me with a view about 
which properties are doing the causal work. I feel the pain and I move my hand, but I 
do not experience the painfulness of the pain causing the hand to move. It is Hume all 
the way.  
 In fact, both experience and science offer some support to epiphenomenalism 
about conscious states. For sometimes we feel the pain after we have performed the 
action that we might otherwise think was motivated by it. And science tells us that 
sometimes the neural events that initiate the causal processes of our actions occur 
before we know what we are trying to do.6 
 Many people also seem to be motivated by the idea that it would be 
unfortunate - even terrible - if epiphenomalism were true, and that some of our 
treasured views about ourselves and our place in nature would be under threat. Kim 
                                                
6 See e.g.  Libet (1985), and Haggard and Eimer (1999). The data certainly don’t prove 
epiphenomenalism. But they do suggest that the brain decides what the subject is going to do and then 
afterwards informs the subject of its decision.  
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gives voice to three concerns of that sort. If we keep clearly in mind that it is the 
causal potency of psychological properties that is at issue, I think that we can see that 
the concerns are groundless.  
 First (2000 p. 31): ‘the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our 
psychological states ... have causal effects in the physical world’. A little clarification 
is in order here. It does seem right that my agency requires that I do things because of 
what I want, what I believe and so on. And it seems right to take that as a causal 
‘because’. So, for example, if I jump up and down just because I want to, it is my 
desire to jump up and down that causes me to jump up and down. But that is token-
event causation. What is not at all evident is that our conception of human agency 
requires further that the psychological properties of my desire be causally efficacious 
in moving my body.  
 Second (ibid.): the possibility of human knowledge presupposes the reality of 
psychological causation. For example, Kim says, reasoning requires the causation of 
beliefs by beliefs and memory requires the causation of beliefs by perceptions. I don’t 
think that that’s at all plausible. The acquisition of knowledge is compatible with 
epiphenomenalism even about token mental events. This is not the place to get 
involved with detailed epistemology. But, on standard views, what is required for 
knowledge is that beliefs be caused in ‘the right way’, and whatever that ‘right way’ 
is, it doesn’t require the causes to be psychological. That is part of the point of 
automated computation. In a computer, physical processes ensure the production of 
representations that stand in appropriate rational relations to one another, given their 
interpretations. If we are ensembles of computers, as cognitive science supposes we 
are, then we could be excellent knowledge-acquisition devices whether or not our 
representations’ psychological properties have causal potency. Suppose, for example, 
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that one of a certain creature’s belief-forming mechanisms is a physically 
implemented truth-preserving inference machine that only creates a new belief if it is 
a logical consequence of old ones. If other conditions are right, then this creature 
would be in a good position to acquire new pieces of knowledge via the operation of 
the mechanism, epiphenomenalism or no.  
 Third (still ibid.): ‘the possibility of psychology as a theoretical science 
capable of generating law-based explanations of human behaviour depends on the 
reality of psychological causation: psychological phenomena must be capable of 
functioning as indispensable links in causal chains leading to physical behaviour’. 
Again, this might be right if we are talking of psychological events and processes. 
Many existing branches of psychology are committed to the existence of causal 
psychological laws. The laws relate psychological phenomena to their effects. But 
these sciences are not committed to telling a complete story about which properties of 
the causes are responsible for bringing the effects about. This is clear, for example, in 
classical cognitive science. In theorising about a given cognitive system, a cognitive 
scientist aims to tell us three stories about which representations will cause the 
production of which other representations: semantic, syntactic and physical (e.g. 
neural). Prima facie, given the way most of us tend to think about causation, it looks 
as though cognitive science does aim to tell us something about which properties of 
representations are causally responsible for their characteristic effects: the physical 
ones. (I am not convinced that even that much is right. But let that pass.) But what 
cognitive science emphatically does not tell us is whether the syntactic and semantic 
properties are causally efficacious in respect of the same effects. That is why the 
matter is still debated by philosophers. Existing psychology leaves open questions 
about the efficacy of psychological properties. And future psychology will be able to 
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accommodate the causal role of psychological properties, whatever that role turns out 
to be.  
 Kim’s rejection of overdetermination and his epiphobia lead him to try and 
formulate a plausible version of reductionism. Like most of us, Kim accepts multiple 
realisation. The proposal he outlines (which is similar to David Lewis’s (Lewis 1980) 
brand of functionalism), is as follows. (Kim does not fully endorse the proposal but 
rather expresses hope that it might turn out to be right). On the view Kim proposes, 
psychological descriptions are equivalent to second-order functional descriptions.7 So, 
for example, to satisfy some mental predicate ‘M’ is to have some first-order 
property, Pn, such that Pn has some particular characteristic causal role. Pn will be a 
physical property, in effect a realiser  (an m(M)) for the mental property M.  Kim 
assumes that M has multiple physical realizers in different ‘species and structures and 
can have different realizers in different possible worlds’ (2001 110). He continues 
(ibid.):  
 
The reduction consists in identifying M with its realizer Pi relative to the 
species or structure under consideration (also relative to the reference world). 
Thus M is P1 in species 1, P2 in species 2, and so on. Given that each instance 
of M has exactly the causal powers of its realiser on that occasion ... all the 
causal explanatory work done by an instance of M that occurs in virtue of the 
instantiation of realizer P1 is done by P1 ...  
 
                                                
7 Kim doubts that this is true of terms for qualitative mental states, but thinks it might be true of 
representational states.  
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This offers an illusion of saving the efficacy of mental properties. Here is the illusion: 
we have a mental property M, in a species or structure  k,  at a possible world Wj, and 
that property is identical with some Pk and so, unproblematically, has Pk’s causal 
powers. A couple of clarifications should bring out why it is an illusion. First, ‘species 
or structures’ are those items that have just one way of realising M at any given 
world.  Maybe talk of species is here appropriate for some types of mental property, 
like, say, the sort of pain caused by burning. (Note, however, that Kim himself is not 
optimistic about the possibility of the story applying to phenomenal properties). And 
it might be appropriate for certain representational properties as well, such as 
representations in hard-wired bits of computational modules. For such things, maybe, 
M has a single realizer across a whole species. But talk of species is not appropriate 
for lots of interesting psychological states. Consider propositional attitudes, for 
example. It is very unlikely that a given propositional attitude, such as the belief that 
Barcelona is beautiful, will have the same physical realisations in different people, or, 
perhaps, in the same individual at different times. So, at least as far as propositional 
attitudes are concerned, ‘structures’ are likely to be individual cognizers, or 
cognizers-during-periods, at particular worlds.  
The second point of clarification is that what get identified with the Pns are not 
psychological properties of the kind whose efficacy was in question. The properties at 
issue are those ascribed by psychology, like the property of believing that Barcelona 
is beautiful. What get identified with the Pns are, rather, properties that might be 
described along the lines of: M-in-structure-K-in-W j. And of course M-in-structure-
K-in-W j, M-in-structure-K-in-Wk  and M-in-structure-J-in-Wl  etc. are all different 
properties. But such properties are not the ones that feature in psychological 
generalisations. If you and I and Genoveva all believe that Barcelona is beautiful, then 
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we share an interesting psychological property and the question arises of whether that 
property is efficacious. It does not help answer that question to say that the property 
of being my-actual-belief-that-Barcelona-is-beautiful is identical with some Pi and 
therefore is efficacious and the property of being your-actual-belief-that-Barcelona-is-
beautiful is identical with some Pj and so it, too, is efficacious, etc..  
The illusion is thus that there exists a tenable position that saves mental 
causation via a version of type-identity theory, while at the same time endorsing 
multiple realisation. Unfortunately, there isn’t. The properties in whose efficacy we 
are interested are the multiply realised ones, and those cannot be identified with the 
physical.  
 In fact, psychological properties suffer a worse fate than mere impotence, in 
Kim’s own opinion. Psychological descriptions are to be reconstructed as functional 
descriptions, so, at first pass, we would construe psychological properties as 
functional properties. But Kim doesn’t really believe in functional properties, since he  
makes a case for ‘eschewing the talk of functional properties in favor of functional 
concepts and expressions.’ (Kim 2000, 110.)  According to Kim, functional concepts 
and expressions are perfectly good and useful. But they don’t pick out real properties: 
or at least they don’t pick out ‘robust’ properties of the sort that feature in proper 
scientific generalisations.  
 I think that the fate of Kim’s package reveals the dangers of believing in 
multiple realization while rejecting both overdetermination and epiphenomenalism.  
It very much looks as though multiple realization is just one of those things we will 
have to accept. So it seems sensible to see if we can make a reasonable case for one of 
the other options. I will now outline Segal and Sober’s (1991) defence of an 
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overdetermination approach, and argue that it fails. I will then offer an alternative that 
I will present as a version of epiphenomenalism.  
 
4. Segal and Sober 
 
Segal and Sober offer a sufficient condition for the causal efficacy of a macro-
property, which they label ‘(P5)’, and argue that psychological properties meet that 
condition. I will state (P5), which is a touch complicated, and say a little about the 
motivation behind it. 
 
(P5) If (i) it is a (possibly nonstrict) law that every F event causes a G event and (ii) 
in each case in which an F event causes a G event there exist micro-properties 
m(F), m(F)' and m(G) such that the cause's being F mereologically supervenes 
on its being m(F) and the effect's being G supervenes on its being m(G) and 
possession of m(F) includes possession of m(F)' and the cause's being m(F)' 
causes the effect's being m(G), then F is efficacious in the production of Gs. 
 
(P5) is an attempt to explain macro-causation in terms of micro-causation. The idea is 
that the combination of lawfulness and supervenience requirements should be strong 
enough to rule out all counterexamples. It is well known that laws aren’t enough: for 
example, successful matings of blue-eyed individuals cause births of blue-eyed 
children. But the property of involving blue-eyed individuals is not causally 
efficacious in respect of the mating’s production of blue-eyed children. Rather, it’s a 
property relating to the parents’ genes that causes both the parents and the children to 
have blue eyes. Segal and Sober’s thought was that correlations of this sort could be 
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ruled out by requiring a sufficiently tight relation between the macro-property of the 
cause and the micro-properties that we assume to be doing causal work in bringing 
about the effect. Mereological supervenience was thought to do the trick. Roughly 
speaking, mereological supervenience is the converse of the ‘makes it the case that’ 
relation that we talk about when we explain why an object has certain macro-
properties by citing properties of and relations among its components (at some level 
of description): e.g. the way the diamond’s crystals are bound together makes it the 
case that the diamond is hard. The property of being blue-eyed does not 
mereologically supervene on the relevant genetic properties of a successful mating 
between blue-eyed individuals (although it does supervene on them in some weak 
sense).  
In fact, even by Segal and Sober’s own account, (P5) is too weak as stated. 
They require further that F be a ‘substantial’ property, meaning a property that pulls 
its weight in good scientific generalisations. This rules out properties like being-red-
or-weighing-a-hundred-pounds. They admit that they don’t have a particularly clear 
or informative account of what makes for a substantial property.  
(P5) caters specifically for cases in which the supervenience base of F is 
complex and includes distinguishable micro-properties. This is to allow for cases in 
which some but not all of the components of the base are involved in the causal 
transaction at issue. For example: smoking causes cancer. In fact, the activity of 
smoking  involves all sorts of things that do not cause cancer. Only some of what is 
involved in smoking - the inhalation of material that has certain specific carcinogenic 
properties - does the work of causing cancer. 
 Segal and Sober go on to argue that mental causation fits that model: 
psychological properties mereologically supervene on complex neural (and perhaps 
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other) properties, some of which are involved in the causal transactions of interest and 
some of which are not.  
 Segal and Sober note that their view entails that many second-order functional 
properties are causally efficacious with respect to the effects relative to which they are 
defined. This leads them into a dispute with Ned Block. Block allows that second-
order functional properties might be efficacious in respect of certain effects in which 
intelligent beings recognize them. But he denies that they are efficacious in respect 
the specific effects that define them. He discusses a bullfighter’s cape. Since the cape 
is red, it is provocative to bulls (let us suppose, he says, for the sake argument, even 
though it is not in fact true). The bullfighter uses the cape to provoke the bull. Block 
claims that it is the redness of the cape that caused the bull to be provoked, and not its 
provocativeness.  
 Segal and Sober voice the suspicion that Block has confused properties with 
ways of referring to properties. They draw on the thought that we should not think 
that a property is inefficacious with respect to a certain effect merely because we pick 
it out by adverting to that very effect. They discuss the example of solubility, saying 
this:  
 
we might construe solubility as a second order property, defined thus: 
(i) x is soluble iff x possesses some property F such that x's being F causes x 
to dissolve when immersed. 
But solubility may be defined in other ways. Suppose that there is a unique 
substantial property that causes objects to dissolve. This property may be 
defined as follows: 
(ii) solubility is the property that causes objects to dissolve when immersed. 
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So (i) and (ii) provide alternative definitions of the same property. It follows 
that second order properties may have effects on stupid objects. Of course, 
there may be no substantial property defined by (ii). But this is what Block 
would need to show to establish his claim. 
 
But it is Segal and Sober and not Block who display confusion in matters relating to 
properties and ways of referring to properties. I take it that a unique substantial 
property that causes objects to dissolve when immersed, would be a micro-property.  
Definition (ii), if it defines anything real (which I doubt), defines that micro-property. 
But the existence of such a micro-property is metaphysically contingent. Surely, even 
if solubility has only one nomologically possible realizer, it has many metaphysically 
possible ones. But then some metaphysically possible objects are soluble in sense (i) 
but not in sense (ii), since they have some property that causes them to dissolve when 
immersed, but not the particular property that causes nomologically possible objects 
to dissolve. So (i) and (ii) do not define the same property.  
 And that makes trouble for (P5). For even if a certain range of functionally-
specified properties, namely those exemplified by solubility in sense (ii) (if there is 
such a property) can be efficacious in the relevant respects, (P5) incorrectly licenses 
the efficacy of others.  
 Block was right. Functional - that is, genuinely dispositional –properties, 
whether second-order or not, are not efficacious with respect to their characteristic 
effects. (For extended discussion of this general issue see Rupert, 2006). To help see 
this, let us reformulate (i) slightly as (iii): 
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(iii) x is soluble iff (a) x would dissolve if immersed and (b) x would be caused to do 
so by some property of x’s.  
 
Now, it is part of the notion of a causally efficacious property that it plays a specific 
role in the causal explanation why its possessors bring about their effects. A property 
that is efficacious in respect of causing an object to dissolve in water has to enter as a 
causal factor in the explanation of why the object would dissolve, if immersed in 
water. Solubility in sense (iii) can’t do that because an object’s being soluble in that 
sense just is, in part, its being such as to dissolve when immersed.8   
 Segal and Sober repeat Davidson’s remark to the effect that statements like 
‘the cause of A caused A’ are uninformative but, of course, not false. They do this to 
emphasise the point that just because our description of a cause relates it to an effect 
does not mean that it is not the cause of that effect. But properties differ from ordinary 
individual objects and events. Properties can be essentially dispositional, ordinary 
individuals and events can’t. For one thing, the cause of A is not even necessarily 
related to A: it might have occurred without A having occurred. But an object can’t be 
soluble in sense (iii) and yet not dissolve if immersed. Moreover, the cause of A has 
other properties than merely being the cause of A, and its possession of some of those 
                                                
8 I set aside worries about finkish dispositions (Mumford 1996). I am assuming that any fink-resistant 
analysis of solubility will include an ineliminable counterfactual element of a kind that sustains the 
claim of this paragraph.  Lewis’s (1997) account, for example, fits the bill. Lewis himself thinks that 
dispositions can be efficacious. But his account of this (ibid. 152) employs a very similar magic trick to 
Kim’s. (I suppose Kim got the idea from Lewis). Moreover, he does not engage with the real problem, 
which is that since an object’s possession of a disposition partly consists in its being such that it would 
cause certain effects in certain circumstances, the object’s possession of the disposition cannot be a 
cause of such effects in such circumstances.  
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other properties explain why it caused A.  And while one can describe solubility in 
sense (iii) without talking of objects dissolving, one cannot use such descriptions in an 
explanation of why solubility in sense (iii) causes objects to dissolve. There is no such 
explanation.  
 I will say more about dispositions and causal efficacy in the next section. For 
now, note that (P5) entails that many essentially dispositional properties are causally 
efficacious in respect of their defining effects; for example solubility, fragility and 
elasticity, all considered on the model of (iii). So (P5) won’t do.  
 If one wanted follow up on Segal and Sober’s start, one could perhaps deal 
with the problem by adding a further constraint: where F is a substantial and not 
essentially dispositional property, (P5). Or, indeed, one might try to argue that 
dispositional properties are not substantial. These paths do not tempt me, however, 
partly for reasons that will emerge in the next sections and partly because there is 
another problem with (P5).  
 Consider the particular sort of red glow that red-hot pokers get.9  It is likely 
that it is a non-strict law that objects with that very specific sort of red glow cause 
wax to melt. Arguably, the red glow mereologically supervenes on the agitation of the 
objects’ molecules, and it is the latter that causes the agitation of the wax’s molecules 
which, is the supervenience base of the wax’s melting. But the red glow is not 
causally efficacious in respect of melting the wax.  
 One might doubt that it is a law that objects of that colour melt wax. Maybe a 
really good special-effects person could create objects that have that colour at room 
temperature. Maybe. But we can still imagine a possible world in which there are 
mechanisms that systematically prevent the creation of any such objects, so that there, 
                                                
9 Helen Beebee p.c. suggested (but did not confidently endorse) the counterexample.  
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it is a ceteris paribus law that objects of the requisite colour melt wax. But still it is 
not because objects have that colour that they melt wax.  
 Before continuing with the issue of mental causation in particular (section 5, 
below) I will say more about the metaphysics of properties, dispositions and 
causation.  
 
5.  Properties, Dispositions and Causation 
 
My main concern in this section is to defend a particular general view of the relation 
between properties and causation, and, in the light of this view, to discuss the role of 
properties in causal explanation. At issue are all substantial properties that feature in 
causal explanations. Substantial relations and relational properties, such as 
siblinghood and reference to Phosphorus are included. The view thus has wide, but 
not universal scope, failing to apply to properties of abstract objects, such as being a 
prime number. Causation itself is assumed as a primitive relation.  
 The view I wish to defend has important features in common with Sydney 
Shoemaker’s and is sometimes attributed to him (erroneously, I think).  I will call it 
‘extreme dispositionalism.’ (Hawthorne, 2006 226, calls it ‘full-blooded causal 
structuralism’). 
 The rough idea of extreme dispositionalism is that the properties at issue are 
just clusters of dispositions. So, for example, what it is for an object to be spherical is 
for it to be such that if placed on a slope, it would roll down; if placed in certain 
relations to a mirror it would cast a round image; if placed on plasticine it would 
create a hemispherical hollow; and so on and so forth.   
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 We can consider a more refined version of extreme dispositionalism which 
identifies properties not with dispositions but with what Shoemaker (2003 213) calls 
‘conditional powers’.  Dispositions relate objects to effects in circumstances: to be 
soluble is to be such that you would dissolve, if immersed, etc.. Conditional powers 
relativise dispositions (powers) to other properties the object might possess. So, for 
example, a spherical object has the power to produce a round image, if placed in 
certain relations to a mirror, if it has a reflective surface, etc.. And it has the power to 
produce a hemispherical hollow if placed on plasticine, if it is hard and heavy, etc..  
  As I said, extreme dispositionalism is sometimes attributed to Shoemaker.  
And, indeed, he does occasionally appear to endorse it: e.g. ‘we can express my view 
by saying that properties are clusters of conditional powers’ (2003, 213). But it is 
clear from the context that this is merely an incautious formulation.  He explicitly 
distinguishes properties from dispositions, which he calls ‘powers’.  And he thinks of 
an object’s properties as explaining its powers: an object’s powers are ‘grounded in’ 
its properties. There is thus a fundamental distinction between Shoemaker’s theory 
and extreme dispositionalism. According to Shoemaker, properties are not conditional 
powers, but rather the grounds of those powers: ‘a thing’s powers or dispositions are 
distinct from, because grounded in, its intrinsic properties’ (2003 213). So, according 
to Shoemaker, sphericity is not the particular bunch of conditional powers associated 
with spheres, but rather that property in virtue of which spheres have that particular 
bunch of conditional powers.10  
So, according to Shoemaker, properties are individuated in terms of the 
conditional powers that they endow on their possessors. To be spherical, for example, 
is to have that property in virtue of the possession of which an object has the 
                                                
10 This view is consistent with what Hawthorne (2006 226) calls ‘modest structuralism’.  
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particular conditional powers characteristic of spheres. It is, of course, a consequence 
of this view that causal relations among properties are metaphysically necessary. On 
this view, it is metaphysically necessary, for example, that a hard, heavy, spherical 
etc. object would cause a hemispherical hollow if place on something soft like 
plasticine.  
 Both theories – the extreme one and Shoemaker’s – share two excellent 
features, that I will now discuss.   
 The first is from Shoemaker (2003 214-5).  Suppose, for the sake reductio, that 
properties F and G are not individuated by the powers of their possessors. Then you 
could get two objects that were utterly indistinguishable by any possible test, yet 
differed in some of their properties. But then, it seems, we could never know anything 
about these different properties. Of course, it is in principle possible that some good 
theory might entail the existence of such properties. But there appears to be no reason 
to believe that there is any such theory. So it is sensible to conclude that F=G iff 
possessors of F and possessors of G have the same conditional powers, hence that 
properties are individuated by the powers of their possessors. 
 This argument is sometimes derided as verificationist. But it is better seen as 
an application of Occam’s razor: do not posit properties that make no difference to 
anything (cp Hawthorne, 2006 219). Of course, if there were robust properties that 
failed to associate with causal differences yet served some other explanatory purpose, 
then there would be reason to believe in them. But there do not seem be any.  
Here is the second desirable feature of the dispositional accounts. Suppose I 
throw a stone at a window and the window breaks. Why did the window break? 
Material science tells us about that (see e.g. Gordon, 86). The stone is stiff (that is to 
say, the material has a high ‘Young’s modulus’, or resistance to deformation). The 
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stone is massive and spherical.  And it is tougher than the glass (it has, inter alia, 
higher impact strength). The stone is travelling fast and a small area of its surface 
comes into contact with the glass. The glass is thin, relatively weak etc., and it breaks.  
 Now it is obvious on inspection, I claim, that a number of the predicates 
featured in the explanation are dispositional and pick out conditional powers. Young’s 
modulus and impact strength are paradigm cases: for the stone to be thus stiff and thus 
strong just is, in part, for it to be such that, given its other properties, it would break 
such a thing as the window, under suitable impact. So, suppose you have objects 
somewhat similar to the stone and the window and you throw the former at the latter 
and the stone breaks, rather than the window. Investigation reveals that their shapes, 
Young’s moduli and every property other than their impact strengths are just the same 
as the originals. It follows logically that the impact strength differs in at least one 
case. Either the second window had higher impact strength than the first window, or 
the second stone had lower impact strength than the first stone, or both.  
 Now it is tempting to suppose that not all of the properties featuring in the 
explanation stand in metaphysically necessary connections to the causal powers of 
their possessors: the stone’s shape, for example. It does not seem that being spherical 
is necessarily connected to the capacity to break windows. 
 But further reflection shows that the tempting supposition is mistaken. To give 
a proper account of what having a certain degree, D, of strength is, we have to talk 
about the shapes of strong things. But if we are to treat D as a conditional power, thus 
properly accounted for, then shape is metaphysically implicated in the causal nexus. 
Strength can only be necessarily connected to the effects of its possessors if shape is 
too. There is no metaphysically possible world W in which the stone has all its actual 
properties but fails to break the window because sphericity is associated with different 
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conditional powers in W. It is, therefore, metaphysically necessary that spherical 
things that share the other properties of the stone, break things such as the window. If 
there is a world W1, in which the stone doesn’t break the window, but is still 
spherical, then it follows that in W1, either the stone or the window differs from how 
it is in W in respect of at least one property: either the stone is less stiff or strong or 
the window is stiffer or stronger, or whatever. It is by the causal relations holding 
among their possessors that such properties, the dispositional ones like stiffness and 
strength, are defined.  
 The connection between, say, fragility and breakages is relatively obvious to 
us. It is conceptually necessary that fragile things break, when hit hard. Or, to put it 
better, in a way that makes the conceptual necessity more obvious: it is conceptually 
necessary that sufficiently fragile things break when hit hard enough by things of the 
right sort. Material science spells out and quantifies tautologies of that ilk, replacing 
the crude common-sense notions of fragility and the like with technical, quantitative 
ones that fit the contours of the real world.  
 The connection between sphericity and breakages is not obvious to us at first 
glance. There is nothing in the mere concept of sphericity, considered by itself, that 
immediately relates it to breakages. However, I do think that the material scientific 
explanation of what happens when a spherical stone breaks a window articulates a 
conceptual necessity. Once you understand the concepts involved, you will see that a 
thing with the properties of the stone would break a thing such as the window, under 
the relevant circumstances. The explanation includes no appeal to conceptually or 
metaphysically contingent laws of nature. It just follows from the correct account of 
the properties of and relations between the two things, that the stone would break the 
window.  
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 The dispositional theories of properties thus correctly predict that 
paradigmatic causal transactions, like the breakings of windows by stones, involve 
metaphysical necessity. This is their second desirable feature.  
 What seems a virtue to me seems a vice to others. Lewis has objected to the 
view that causal relations are metaphysically necessary as follows. Lewis adopts a 
‘principle of recombination’: (Lewis, 1986 88) ‘roughly speaking the principle is that 
anything can co-exist with anything else’. The principle expresses a version of the 
Humean idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. And 
it naturally leads to the conclusion that laws of nature are not metaphysically 
necessary, for events that are connected by natural law are distinct existences, and 
hence are mixed and matched in all different ways across possible worlds. Events of 
stiff, strong stones hitting windows are distinct from events of windows breaking. 
Hence there is a possible world where events of the former kind are not followed by 
events of the latter kind. So the principle of recombination entails that properties 
featuring in natural laws are not metaphysically connected to the powers of their 
possessors after all (Lewis 1986 163). Lewis anticipates the possibility that his 
opponent will simply reject the principle of recombination and responds that he would 
thereby be leaving the frying pan for the fire. He omits to say which fire.  
But there is no clash between the principle of recombination and dispositional  
theories of properties. There are surely lots of worlds in which people like me throw 
things like the stone at things like the window and in which the window does not 
break. We can allow that there are as many of these worlds as Lewis wants. That is 
not the issue. The issue is how we should describe such worlds. Lewis wishes to 
describe them as worlds in which stiff, strong stones fail to break windows. The 
dispositional theorist can just as well describe them as worlds in which the stones or 
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the windows or both have properties different from their actual ones: the glass, for 
example, might be stronger or the stone less strong. Hence Lewis’s objection misses 
the mark.  
 So both dispositional theories look promising. Which is superior? There are 
three main objections to extreme dispositionalism, which I will now discuss.  
The first objection gives voice to a feeling of unease about extreme 
dispositionalism  that I think is widely shared.  It is from David Armstrong  
(Armstrong 1999, p. 67) (who credits a version of it to Richard Swinburne):  
 
Every causal transaction, according to [extreme dispositionalism ],11 is a 
matter of things with certain potentialities bringing it about that these or other 
things have further potentialities, because properties are analyzed as nothing 
but potentialities. In Scholastic language, we never get beyond potency to act. 
Act, so far as it occurs, is just a shifting around of potencies … ‘Where’s the 
bloody horse?’ as the poet Roy Campbell might have asked.   
 
The idea seems to be that extreme dispositionalism is viciously regressive or that it 
leaves properties ungrounded, in some sense. But, as stated, Armstrong’s claim 
amounts to little more than an expression of incredulity.   Suppose that I make a 
snowball. Since I am strong, I can exert pressure on the snow and cause the snowball 
to be hard.  It is very natural to think that my strength and the snowball’s hardness are 
both dispositional properties. So this is a case of one potentiality being involved in the 
creation of another potentiality. And there is nothing particularly mystifying about 
that. We understand what is going on. It is a consequence of extreme dispositionalism  
                                                
11 The actual quote is ‘according to Shoemaker’.  
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that causation is always like that. And why shouldn’t it be so? If it can happen some 
of the time, why should it not happen all of the time? What is needed here is an 
argument, not a statement of mystification. Of course, extreme dispositionalism  is 
somewhat mystifying. But so is the alternative: that e.g. a fragile object has, in 
addition to the genuinely dispositional property of (roughly speaking) being such that 
it would break when hit and the micro-structural property that explains why it would 
break when hit, a further, intermediate property in which the disposition is 
‘grounded’.  
 Extreme dispositionalism might indeed generate an infinite regress: each 
property is analysed in terms of further properties.  But the regress need not be 
vicious. It would just require there to be infinitely many properties. Alternatively, the 
theory might generate a circle: the analysis of a property sooner or later leading back 
to that property itself. But again, the circle need not be vicious (see Holton, 1999 for 
discussion).   In either case, the proposed structure of the metaphysical space of 
properties is at least coherent. (See Yablo, 1993, for related discussion.) 
 The second objection can be found in Hawthorne (2006) (a similar argument 
appears briefly in Armstrong, 1999).   Here is a possible causal structure.  There are 
four properties A, B, C and D. A causes C. B causes C. (A&B) cause D. But, the 
objection goes, there is no way for the extreme dispositionalist to distinguish A and B, 
since their causal profiles are identical.  
 There are two ways of spelling the example out, neither of which successfully 
refutes extreme dispositionalism. The crucial question is whether D is supposed to be 
caused by the combination of an A object and a B object or whether a single object’s 
possession of A and B is supposed to cause D. If the first, then the extreme 
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dispositonalist has no problem distinguishing A and B. If the second, then the extreme 
dispositionalist can reject the possibility.12  
 Let’s consider the first option first.  On this understanding it is easy for the 
extreme dispositionalist to distinguish A and B. Suppose that object o1 has A. Then a 
B object is disposed, in conjunction with o1, to cause D. But an A object is not 
disposed, in conjunction with o1, to cause D. So A and B correspond to distinct and 
distinguishable dispositions.  
 Let us turn to the second option and consider what a world with the alleged 
structure would look like. Let’s consider how objects would behave. Some objects – 
call these ‘F’ objects - would cause C. Some objects – call these ‘G’ objects - would 
cause D. And that is it. The objector asks us to suppose that in the universe under 
discussion there is a further, invisible, reality: in fact, the F objects fall into two lots: 
those that have A and those that have B. Moreover, the G objects that cause D do so 
because they have both A and B. The difference between A and B, of course, 
manifests itself in no way at all.  
 If we allow this possibility, then we open the floodgates. We must also admit 
that there is a possible universe in which objects behave just like that, but where the F 
objects divide into three lots: those that have X, those that have Y and those that have 
Z. The G objects have X and Y, but not Z. There is a third possible universe which is 
just like that, except that the G objects have X, Y and Z. Then there is a fourth 
universe where the F objects divide into four lots: those that have W, X, Y and Z. And 
                                                
12 I am pretty sure that Hawthorne intends the first option and not the second.  
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so on, ad infinitum. The extreme dispositionalist can deny that there are all these 
particular possible universes with a clear conscience.13  
 It is not at all obvious that there is any candidate example of a symmetrical 
causal structure that won’t go the same way: either the mirror properties are 
dispositionally distinct, or the claim that structure is possible is not independently 
plausible.  
 More importantly, though, even if such a structure could be described, that 
would be of limited interest to debates about the familiar properties in our world 
whose causal efficacy interests us. Being tough or being spherical or being a belief 
that Barcelona is beautiful or having a charge of –(1/3) might be genuinely 
dispositional even if some other quite distinct possible properties are not.  
 The third objection to extreme dispositionalism  comes from Shoemaker. He 
holds that the manner in which objects can acquire a property can be relevant to the 
property’s individuation. Thus properties cannot be understood purely in terms of 
dispositions or their grounds. The motivation is due to Richard Boyd. It goes as 
follows (Shoemaker 2003 232-4): 
 
 Imagine a world in which the basic elements include four substances, A, B, C 
 and D. Suppose that X is a compound of A and B and Y is a compound of C 
 and D. We can suppose ... that the property of being made of X and the 
 property of being made of Y share all of their causal potentialities.  
 
                                                
13 I take it that moderate dispositionalists, like Shoemaker, who hold that properties ground 
dispositions, would also deny that these are genuine  possibilities.  
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It would follow from extreme dispositionalism  that being made of X and being made 
of Y would be the same property. But Shoemaker finds that counterintuitive, since X 
and Y would be different substances. So, according to Shoemaker, properties are 
individuated not just by their associated powers, but also by the circumstances that 
cause them to be instantiated. His final theory is that property F=property G iff F and 
G endow the same conditional powers on their possessors and whatever 
circumstances suffice to cause an instantiation of F suffice to cause an instantiation of 
G and vice versa. 
 But there is no compelling reason to suppose that X and Y are distinct 
substances. It is at least as natural to suppose that there is just the one substance that 
can be created in either of two ways. Suppose that we lived in Boyd’s world. Would 
we even bother to have two words for X and Y?  That is not likely, since it would be a 
major task to keep track of which samples had which origins. Moreover, we are trying 
to provide an account of properties that feature in causal explanation. From that 
perspective, there is no reason to distinguish being made of X from being made of Y.  
One can of course distinguish X from Y if one wants to. But the distinguishing 
properties are the historical ones: having been created from A and B versus having 
been created from C and D. Those properties are perfectly distinguishable on the 
extreme causal theory, as long as A, B, C and D are themselves distinct in causal 
powers. And it is safe to assume that they are, otherwise Boyd’s example would make 
very little sense. There is thus no need to think of X and Y as different substances. 
They are batches of the same substance that differ only in the manner of their 
creation. 
 So extreme dispositionalism survives all three objections. Given its simplicity 
and elegance, the view stands in good stead and I recommend it.  
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  It is true that both commonsense and science are amenable to the claim that 
the stone broke the window, in part, because of certain of its properties such as 
stiffness and impact strength. But, I suggest, the ‘because’ here means by reason of.  
It is the same ‘because’ that features in, for example logic and mathematics: ‘Socrates 
is mortal because he is a man and all men are mortal.’; ‘Consider a right-angle 
triangle, with sides A and B of 5 cms and 4 cms respectively. The third side, C, is 3 
cms, because A2-B2=C2 and 52-42=32.’14    
 The explanation of the why the stone broke the window is rather like the 
geometrical explanation of why C is 3 cms. And there is nothing wrong with that. It 
makes transparent to us how various combinations of properties interrelate in the 
jigsaw puzzles of causal interactions. It has other virtues as well.  
 One reason why we might want to know, for example, that stiffness and 
strength are properties of the stone that are relevant to whether it would break a 
window is that we can identify its possession of those properties without having to see 
whether it breaks anything. You can feel them with your hand.  
 Another reason why we might be interested is that while it is conceptually 
necessary that something as stiff and strong etc. as the stone would break a weaker 
thing like the window, it is not conceptually necessary that only things with those 
properties can break windows. Under the right conditions, you could break a window 
with a large meringue or a mound of jelly. There are many different combinations of 
properties that can combine to make something able to break a window. So the 
                                                
14 Notice that we can also say: consider a right-angle triangle, with sides A and B of 5 cms and 4 cms 
respectively. Then  A2-B2=C2 because the third side, C, is 3 cms and 52-42=3. What was the 
explanandum has become part of the explanans. We can say that the stone broke the window because it 
is stiff and strong. And we can just as well say stone is stiff and strong because it would break such a 
thing as the window.  
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macroscopic explanation of the event serves to rule out many other possible 
macroscopic explanations.  
 Now, if extreme dispositionalism is right, then macroscopic properties in 
general and psychological properties in particular are dispositional, and so cannot be 
efficacious in bringing about their characteristic effects. Hence we arrive at 
epiphenomenalism. But even if extreme dispositionalism is not right, there is a 
specific reason for supposing that psychological and other macroscopic properties are 
dispositional. This is the topic of the next section.  
  
5. The Standard Package and the Amazing Coincidence 
 
Let us have another look at The Standard Package and its account of mental 
causation. It goes as follows. Suppose that it’s a law that F events cause G events, 
where F and G are psychological properties. F has a variety of physical supervenience 
bases, m(F)1, ...., m(F)n. Every time the law is instantiated, the occurrence of the F 
event is realised by the occurrence of some m(F) event. The m(F) event causes the 
occurrence of some m(G) event, where m(G) is a supervenience base for G. But if that 
is right, then it shrieks for explanation. Consider the m(F)s. They all share two 
properties: (a) they are bases for F and, further, (b) they all tend to cause the 
occurrence of a base for G. That is a remarkable correlation and there must be some 
explanation for it. There must be a connection between being a base for F and tending 
to cause bases for G.  
 Suppose that you have an account of representation according to which being 
a mental event with a certain content has nothing to do with what the event is likely to 
cause. Then you might have a lot of trouble explaining the correlation. That is exactly 
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the position that Jerry Fodor is in. On his account, the content of a mental 
representation type is determined by the kinds of thing that would cause tokens of the 
type to occur. Thus the content of a representation depends on its temporally 
backward-looking causal sensitivities. Those are evidently distinct from the 
representation’s temporally forward-looking causal powers, what it, in turn, goes on 
to cause.  
Fodor recognizes a version of the problem in Fodor (1994). His account of 
psychological content entails that it is referential. A person’s ‘Hesperus’ 
representation and their ‘Phosphorus’ representations are causally sensitive to the 
same planet, hence, according, to Fodor, they have the same content. But, of course, 
the representations may behave differently in a person’s psychological economy: they 
have relevantly different forward-looking causal powers. And so Fodor’s account 
leaves open the possibility that psychology will have lots of predictive failures and be 
no good: for example, a Fodorian reference-only psychology would predict that 
someone who wants to go to Hesperus and believes that boarding the USS Morning 
Star will get him to Phosphorus, would, ipso facto, be likely to board the USS 
Morning Star.  
Fodor spends much time trying to find mechanisms that keep referential 
psychology viable. These would be mechanisms that prevent Frege cases from 
happening too often. But he fails (aee Segal, 1997 and Aydede and Robbins  2001). 
 So what could explain the correlation between a mental event’s content and its 
causal powers? There are two kinds of explanation we might consider: metaphysically 
necessary and metaphysically contingent. Fodor looked for a metaphysically 
contingent one. And one would expect any account of content that relies entirely on 
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historical facts to be in the same position and stand in need of supplementation with 
an account of contingent mechanisms that explain the correlation.  
 But obviously functionalism has a built-in explanation of the correlation, one 
that depends entirely on the metaphysics of content. What it is to be an event with a 
particular content is (in part) to have certain specific causal powers. So, for example, 
it is no accident that my desire to eat an Italian sausage tends to cause me to eat an 
Italian sausage, under certain conditions. Having that tendency is a metaphysically 
necessary condition for being a desire with that content.  So, of course, any micro-
properties that realise the desire will tend to cause events that realise my eating an 
Italian sausage.  
 Interpretationism is afloat in the same boat. According to interpretationism, a 
set of states of a physical system is representational iff there exists an interpretation of 
those states such that actual (and counterfactual) complex behaviour of the system 
consistently makes (and would make) reasonable sense under that interpretation. The 
notion of interpretation involved is the logical one: there is a mapping from the states 
onto some suitable domain. According to interpretationism, the states then really 
represent what they represent in the logical sense, under any sensible interpretation.  
 Interpretationism can explain the correlation between a state’s content and its 
effects. Being sensibly interpretable is a holistic property of a system. An 
interpretation of a given state will only make sense in the context of an appropriate 
interpretation of the state’s causes and effects. And the relevant kind of 
appropriateness is just what is required to explain the correlation. For example. a 
given state will only be interpretable as, say, a desire to eat an Italian sausage if, under 
certain circumstances, it causes a state interpretable as an eating of an Italian sausage.  
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 Interpretationism is not usually thought of as a variety of functionalism. But 
(as leading interpretationist, Robert Cummins, admits (Cummins 1989)) they are 
metaphysically equivalent. Whether a particular interpretation makes sense of a 
system depends only on causal relations among states of the system.15 So I will use 
‘functionalism’ to include interpretationism in its extension.  
Functionalism’s capacity to explain a correlation that cries out for explanation, 
while other accounts of content leave the mystery unexplained, seems to be a strong 
consideration in favour of it. 16 I will proceed on the assumption that some variety of 
functionalism is true.17  
                                                
15 Of course, there are many different varieties of functionalism. Some functionalists take causal 
relations between the system and the external world to be relevant to content (e.g. Harman 1987). But 
then some interpretationists have a parallel constraint on the set of true interpretations (e.g. Gallistel 
1993). 
16 I don’t believe that functionalism is true for phenomenal properties. If phenomenal properties feature 
in causal laws, then perhaps they reduce to neurological properties. They might well be much less 
multiply realisable than representational properties and species-specific reductions might be viable. 
Henceforth I will consider only representational properties.  
17 Teleological theories of content also have resources that might help to explain the 
coincidence. According to teleological theories of content, the content of a representation is explained 
in terms of the representation’s function. And the function of a representation will typically have a lot 
to do with what it causes in what circumstances. As you almost certainly know, frogs have a 
mechanism that is triggered by small objects whizzing past that causes an automatic tongue protrusion. 
If the flying object is a fly within range, then the frog catches it with its tongue and eats it. Let us 
suppose that the mechanism is triggered by a representation with the content: fly. The reason the 
representation means fly is because it causes the frog to do something that is beneficial for it in the 
presence of flies. If we put in fly for F and snapping for G in the prima facie coincidental structure, 
then we see that is not a coincidence that m(F)s represent flies and cause tongue protrusions. But 
teleological theories have grave problems, see in particular Peacocke (1992 129-33).  
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6. Conclusion: Epiphenomenalism Versus Overdetermination 
  
If functionalism is true, then mental properties are dispositional, hence not causally 
efficacious, and epiphenomenalism is true. But mental properties are none the worse 
for that. They are just as real as paradigmatic physical properties like stiffness and 
impact strength. And they can play indispensable roles in excellent causal 
explanations, just like their physical counterparts. There is nothing wrong with or 
second-rate about dispositional properties.  
 I said above that I would present my view as a variety of epiphenomenalism. It 
seems an appropriate label. But notice that it is very similar to another view. Suppose 
we replace the notion of a causally efficacious property with, say, the notion of a 
casually explanatory property.18 We could explicate this notion by examples; the 
stone’s stiffness and impact strength are causally explanatory in respect of its 
breaking the window, its colour and age are not. To be causally explanatory is to 
feature in a causal explanation in the familiar way. It is just that we now understand 
that that familiar sort of explanation has a different character than we thought. We 
thought the properties were only nomologically related to the effects they explain, 
whereas actually they relate by metaphysical necessity. We thought the ‘because’ in 
the ‘the stone broke the window because it was strong ...’ was an affect because, 
whereas actually it is a reason because.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
18 Compare Jackson and Pettit (1988) on what they call ‘causally relevant’ properties. These are 
relevant to causal explanation even if causally inefficacious.  
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We might then use ‘epiphenomenalism’ to apply to the thesis that mental 
properties are not causally explanatory in respect of the effects of their possessors. 
Such terminological moves seem not unreasonable. We could then reasonably claim 
to be proponents of an overdetermination approach rather than of epiphenomenalism.  
It appears that the difference between overdetermination and epiphenomenalism is 
largely rhetorical. 
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